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ABSTRACT
This paper offers an empirical test of ownership mix efficiency in the U.S. nursing home
industry. We test to compare the benefits of quality assurance with the costs from the attenuation
of property rights that result from an increased presence of nonprofit organizations. The
empirical results suggest that too few nonprofit nursing homes may exist in the typical market
area of the U.S. The policy implication is that more quality of care per dollar might be obtained
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I.  Introduction 
 
Since Kenneth Arrow’s classic 1963 study “Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics 
of Medical Care,” economists have been interested in why nonprofit organizations are 
so prevalent in health care markets.  As Arrow pointed out, medical care is a highly 
complex  personal  service,  one  for  which  there  exists  considerable  uncertainty 
surrounding quality.  One hypothesis for the prevalence of nonprofits in healthcare 
markets  is  that  nonprofit  ownership  status  serves  as  a  signal  for  quality  in  the 
presence of asymmetric information.   
Hansmann (1980) has shown that nonprofit organizations face a non-distribution 
constraint  because  they  cannot  legally  distribute  any  of  their  residual  earnings. 
Nonprofit  organizations  must  dispense  all  residual  earnings  for  the  express 
educational, charitable, or religious purposes for which they were formed.  Thus, the 
non-distribution  constraint  implies  nonprofit  organizations  face  little  financial 
incentive to compromise the quality of care they provide.  This is in contrast to for-
profit  organizations,  which  clearly  have  financial  incentives  to  engage  in 
opportunistic behavior, such as skimping on the quality of care they provide, when 
consumers are imperfectly informed. Consequently, economic theory suggests that an 
isolated nonprofit healthcare organization may offer higher levels of quality than an 
otherwise comparable for-profit organization.
1   
However, given the possible attenuation of property rights caused by the non-
distribution constraint, economists are quick to point out that nonprofit organizations 
are  also  likely  to  face  a  more  severe  principal-agent  problem.  In  particular,  the 
absence of a residual claimant with a financial interest in the organization means that   4 
no  one  individual,  or  group  of  individuals,  has  strong  incentives  to  monitor  the 
behavior of the organization.  Therefore, in a nonprofit healthcare organization, the 
divergence between the interests of the principal(s) and the agent(s) often leads to the 
inefficient  production  and  provision  of  medical  care  services.  This  is  because 
unconstrained managers of nonprofit organizations will be more inclined to pursue 
personal  goals  and  objectives,  which  are  likely  to  conflict  with  minimum  cost 
production, ceteris paribus. Thus, property-rights theory predicts that, in isolation, a 
nonprofit  healthcare  organization  will  produce  at  higher  costs  than  an  otherwise 
comparable for-profit organization.
2  
  While theory tends to be unambiguous in predicting that an “isolated” nonprofit 
organization will produce medical care with higher quality and production costs than 
an otherwise similar for-profit organization, both Hirth (1999) and Grabowski and 
Hirth  (2002)  have  pointed  out  that  nonprofit  and  for-profit  organizations  rarely 
operate in isolation; in fact, they often compete against one another. Consequently, 
they hypothesize that competitive spillovers from nonprofits will lead to a higher 
quality of care in for-profit nursing homes.  In support of their theory, the researchers 
find empirical evidence that an increase in nonprofit market share improves for-profit, 
and overall, nursing home quality.  
  Grabowski and Hirth (2002), and much earlier, Tuckman and Chang (1988), note 
that competitive spillovers from for-profits may influence the behavior of nonprofit 
nursing homes.
3 They argue that competition from for-profit organizations may limit 
the inefficiency of nonprofits. Inefficiency is limited because nonprofits have to be 
more concerned with the costs of producing medical care when facing competition   5 
from the more cost conscious for-profit organizations.  Grabowski and Hirth conclude 
(p. 19) that ‘If non-profits have a competitive advantage in “trustworthiness” while 
for-profits have greater incentives for efficiency, intersectoral competition can yield 
better outcomes than a market consisting exclusively of one type of firm.’ 
  Based upon the notion that a mix of for-profit and nonprofit organizations may 
promote societal well being, this paper develops and conducts a unique empirical test 
to assess the efficiency of the ownership mix in the typical nursing-home market. As 
previously discussed, the existence of both nonprofit and for-profit nursing homes in 
a single market area can be expected to generate both social benefits and costs. By 
empirically estimating the relationship between the nonprofit (or for-profit) market 
share  and  nursing  home  care  utilization,  we  can  infer  the  net  social  benefit  of 
additional nonprofit facilities. We discuss this in the next section of this paper and 
also explain how we plan to conduct the empirical test.  Section III describes the data 
and sample used in the empirical analyses. Section IV presents the empirical findings 
and the last section offers conclusions.  
 
II.  Conceptual Model 
 
The approach we use to test for the efficient mix of for-profit and nonprofit nursing 
homes in a geographical market is derived from Svorney (1987). Svorney examined 
the role of professional interests in establishing physician licensure. She argued that 
physician licensure potentially raises costs through higher wages because it acts as an 
entry barrier, but, she emphasized, it may also provide greater benefits in the form of 
quality assurance. The ultimate test of the efficiency of professional licensure, she   6 
argued,  depends  on  whether  or  not  the  favorable  demand  response  outweighs  the 
undesirable supply response.  For example, if the benefit of quality assurance causes 
demand to increase (i.e., shift the demand curve to the right) more than higher wages 
cause supply to decrease (i.e., shift the supply curve to the left), then the utilization of 
physician services increases, and this reflects the net social benefit that physician 
licensure  offers.
4  Hence,  one  may  observe  the  impact  of  a  regulation  (or  type  of 
institution) on the utilization of a particular good or service, and from that draw an 
inference about its effect on economic efficiency. 
In  a  similar  vein,  the  efficiency  of  a  mix  of  health  care  organizations  with 
different ownership forms may be analyzed in this manner.  For example, and in the 
context of our research, suppose we are comparing two similar nursing home markets 
that differ in the following respect: market area “A” is completely dominated by for-
profit facilities whereas market area “B” is characterized by an equal distribution of 
market shares across for-profit and nonprofit facilities.  A graphical exposition of this 
comparison is presented in figure 1 for a competitive marketplace. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 The curves DA and SA represent the demand and supply for nursing home care in 
market A (where for-profit facilities completely dominate). Notice that QA measures 
the market clearing quantity of nursing home care in market A. 
Given the different mix of ownership structures, the markets are likely to differ in 
two principle respects, ceteris paribus. First, there will exist a greater demand for 
nursing  home  care  in  market  area  B  because  of  the  increased  quality  assurance 
resulting  directly  (or  indirectly)  from  the  greater  prevalence  of  nonprofit  nursing   7 
homes. The greater quality assurance is captured by demand curve DB in figure 1. 
Second, the supply of nursing home care may be lower in area B because of the 
higher production costs resulting from the diminished property-rights incentives from 
more nonprofit nursing homes operating in the market.
5 Higher production costs are 
reflected  in  supply  curve  SB  in  figure  1.  Because  the  demand  (quality  assurance) 
effect is assumed to be stronger than the cost effect in our example, the equilibrium 
quantity of nursing home care, QB, is greater in market B than market A. 
  Whether  or  not  the  demand  effect  more  than  offsets  the  supply  effect  in  the 
typical U.S. nursing home market is an empirical question that can be tested using 
multiple regression analyses.  The test can be conducted by observing the impact that 
nonprofit  (or  for-profit)  market  share  has  on  nursing  home  care  utilization, while 
carefully  controlling  for  a  host  of  other  supply  and  demand  factors.  Equation  1 
represents  the  general  reduced-form  model  used  in  the  forthcoming  statistical 
estimations. In equation 1,  i Q  represents the equilibrium quantity of nursing home 
care in market i;  i NPS  represents the market share held by nonprofit nursing homes 
in market i;  ji D  is a vector of j additional variables that are expected to influence the 
demand  for  nursing  home  care  in  market  i;  and  ki S   is  a  vector  of  k  additional 
variables hypothesized to affect the supply of nursing home care in market i. The 
error term, i m , is assumed, for now, to be independent and normally distributed with 
constant variance and a mean of zero (constant terms and/or fixed effects in equation 
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The hypothesis is that the nonprofit share exerts an inverted U effect on the utilization 
of nursing home care as illustrated in Figure 2. The general idea is that both the marginal 
benefits  of  quality  assurance  and  marginal  costs  associated  with  the  attenuation  of 
property rights depend in part on the relative amount of nonprofit organizations in a 
market area. For example, the marginal benefit of increased quality assurance is likely to 
decline as a greater percentage of nonprofit nursing homes locate in a market area. That 
is,  the  same  marginal  improvements  in  quality  become  increasingly  more  difficult  to 
achieve or squeeze out. Similarly, the marginal costs associated with diminished property 
rights incentives may increase with respect to a greater percentage of nonprofit nursing 
homes in a market area, especially if a medical arms race ensues from greater nonprofit 
activity.  For  instance,  nursing  home  may  compete  through  cost-enhancing  nonprice 
means such as superfluous amenities.  
        [INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT THERE] 
Figure 2 allows for diminishing marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs 
from the increased presence of nonprofit organizations. Notice as the nonprofit share 
increases from 0 to NFP*, utilization increases because the marginal benefits of quality 
assurance initially outweigh the marginal costs resulting from the attenuation of property 
rights.  However  at  higher  values  of  the  nonprofit  share  the  converse  holds  such  that 
marginal costs exceed marginal benefits. Hence the coefficient estimates on the linear 
and squared NPS terms are expected to be positive and negative, respectively. Given the 
nonlinear specification, we can solve for the optimal mix of nonprofit (and for-profit) 
nursing homes and compare it to the actual mix for a representative market area.    9 
III. Data and Empirical Test 
Data were gathered for each of the 2,939 nursing home markets in the U.S. to test our 
ownership-efficiency hypothesis.  In our test, the county was assumed to be a reasonable 
approximation  for  the  relevant  geographical  market  for  nursing  home  care.  Ample 
precedent supports the county as a proxy for the relevant geographical market in the 
nursing home industry (e.g., Nyman, 1985; Cohen and Spector, 1996; Grabowski and 
Hirth, 2002; Gulley and Santerre, 2003).  The data used in our empirical analyses are for 
the year 1996 and come from five different sources.  Table 1 reports the mean value, 
standard  deviation,  and  data  source  for  each  of  the  variables  used  in  our  empirical 
analyses.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
The conceptual model indicates that a measure of nursing home care utilization, or 
quantity,  i Q , is necessary to conduct the test. We experimented with several measures of 
utilization, and they all produced highly similar results. The first measure we employed 
was the number of nursing home residents in the market area, expressed both as a fraction 
of the total population and as a fraction of the total number of individuals aged both 65 
years  and  older  and  85  years  and  older.    Ratios  were  used  to  directly  control  for 
population differences across market areas. The second utilization measure used was the 
number of nursing home beds, also expressed as a fraction of both the total population 
and the total number of persons aged both 65 years and older and 85 and older.  Due to 
the high degree of similarity in the findings generated by the various dependent variables, 
we only report the multiple regression results from models that employed nursing home 
residents per capita as a measure of utilization.     10 
The primary focus of our paper is on the impact of ownership mix on efficiency in the 
nursing  home  industry.  As  a  result,  the  aggregate  market  share  of  nonprofit  nursing 
homes is specified in the regression model to capture the different degrees of competitive 
spillovers  in  the  various  nursing  home  markets.    Theoretically,  the  market  share  of 
nonprofit nursing homes may be endogenous. For example, residents may be drawn to 
nonprofit nursing homes because managers set aside extra beds and charge lower prices 
in  pursuit  of  the  personal  utility  derived  from  operating  larger  organizations  (e.g., 
Newhouse, 1970). As a result, we tested if the nonprofit share was endogenous. 
Following  Grabowski  and  Hirth  (2002),  the  instrument  used  to  test  for  the 
endogeneity of the nonprofit nursing home market share is the nonprofit share of hospital 
beds in 1986.
6 In their study, Grabowski and Hirth make a compelling theoretical and 
empirical case for this particular instrument. Theoretically, they argue that the lagged 
value of the nonprofit hospital market share serves as a plausible instrument because it 
captures those areas that have historically been more favorable for the development of 
nonprofit  health  care  organizations.  In  addition,  the  relative  share  of  non-profits  in 
different parts of the country may be deeply rooted in historical factors such as the age of 
the city and different patterns of voluntarism and charitable provision that have little to 
do with the advanced technology and prevalence of third party payment that characterize 
the  current  health  care  environment  (e.g.,  see  Stevens  (1989)  for  a  history  of  the 
organizational structure of the U.S. hospital industry).  Grabowski and Hirth’s statistical 
analysis provided strong support for the suitability of the lagged hospital market share as 
an instrument. Using the instrument discussed above, we employed the Hausman test of   11 
exogeneity. The test failed to reject the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of the nonprofit 
market share. 
As previously mentioned, we must also control for other factors that could result in 
utilization differences across market areas, in an effort to isolate the impact of ownership 
mix on efficiency.  Otherwise, the omission of variables that are correlated with both 
ownership mix and the number of residents could lead us to draw incorrect inferences 
from our empirical results. Following the conceptual model, these other influences are 
broken  down  into  the  aforementioned  demand-side  variables,  j D   and  supply-side 
variables  k S . The demand-side variables affecting nursing home care utilization include: 
population (in logs), population density, the median income (in logs), the poverty rate, 
the  percentage  of  the  population  aged  65  years  and  older,  the  percentage  of  the 
population aged 85 years and older, the percentage of the population that is white, the 
percentage  of  the  female  population  unemployed,  and  the  percentage  of  the  female 
population divorced.  
These demand-side variables are intended to control for differences in the willingness 
and  ability  to  pay  for  nursing  home  care  across  market  areas.  Except  for  a  few,  the 
rationale for including most of these demand-side variables should be self-evident. The 
female  unemployment  and  divorce  rates  are  intended  to  capture  the  availability  of 
informal care outside nursing homes.  The supply-side variables are intended to capture 
relative differences in the costs of providing and the willingness to offer nursing home 
care across the various market areas. As such, they include: the CMS area wage index (in 
logs), a dummy variable denoting the existence of a Certificate of Need law in the state, a 
dummy variable denoting the presence of a nursing facility construction moratorium in   12 
the state, and a set of variables capturing the level and type (e.g., retrospective, case-mix 
adjusted, etc.) of Medicaid reimbursement in the state. We also estimated models using 
state fixed effects in place of these largely state-specific variables.  
We  experimented  with  several  different  specifications  involving  our  dependent 
variable,  nursing  home  residents  per  capita,  and  the  independent  variable  of  interest, 
nonprofit market share.  A linear specification and a specification involving a logistic 
transformation of residents per capita proved to be fairly representative of the various 
results  obtained.  The  logistic  transformation  adjusts  to  some  degree  for  the  skewed 
leftward distribution of the number of nursing home residents per capita. White’s test 
(1980) identified the presence of heteroscadasticity so the estimates in our models have 
been corrected so that they are heteroscadastic-consistent (following his procedure).  
 
IV. Empirical Results 
Ordinary least square (OLS) estimates are reported for four specifications in table 2. The 
first two columns report the OLS results for the linear model and the model involving a 
logistic transformation of the dependent variable without state fixed effects. The last two 
columns report our OLS results for the same specifications, but with state fixed effects 
replacing the state-level variables. Each independent variable’s coefficient estimate and 
its corresponding t-statistic (in absolute terms) shown in parentheses are reported in the 
table.
7  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The results for the control variables are fairly consistent across specifications. Some 
results  are  worth  pointing  out.  First,  the  logistic  transformation  appears  to  provide  a   13 
better fit to theory. Economic theory suggests that market output declines in response to a 
supply decrease resulting from such factors like higher wages. Because production is 
very labor intensive, one would expect such a relationship to hold in the nursing home 
care industry. Notice that the prediction of supply theory is supported by the specification 
involving the logistic transformation of the dependent variable given the negative and 
statistically significant coefficient estimate on the CMS area wage. 
Second, the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates on the CON law 
and moratorium dummy variables in the specifications involving no state fixed effects are 
interesting in terms of their implication.  CON laws are typically viewed as creating an 
entry barrier and thereby leading to a reduction of market output. Our results lend no 
support for this monopoly theory behind CON laws. Lastly, the positive and statistically 
significant  estimated  parameter  on  the  Medicaid  reimbursement  rate  agrees  with  the 
predictions of the dual market model and a recent study by Gulley and Santerre (2003). 
Recall that our conceptual model hypothesizes an inverted U-relationship between the 
nonprofit share and residents per capita. As anticipated, the nonprofit market share does 
exert an inverted U impact on the quantity of nursing home care in all four specifications. 
Moreover, according to the results, the optimal share of nonprofit homes ranges from 
roughly 42 to 46 percent of all nursing homes (shown at the bottom of the table).  
Table 3 shows the distribution of the actual nonprofit market shares in the 2,939 
market areas. On average the nonprofit market share equals 23 percent with a median 
value of nearly 7 percent. According to the table, the nonprofit market share is below 20 
percent in nearly 61 percent of the market areas. An additional 15 percent of all market 
areas are characterized by a nonprofit market share lying somewhere between 20 and 40   14 
percent. Thus, if our specification and empirical findings are correct, efficiency - in terms 
of quality of care per dollar - could be significantly improved in a large percentage of the 
market areas by changing the ownership of nursing homes from for-profit to not-for-
profit status. A change in the ownership of nursing homes from not-for-profit to for-profit 
status would also have to occur but only in less than 22 percent of all market areas.  
These results are certainly intriguing because they suggest ownership conversion may 
be necessary in the nursing home industry to bring about increased efficiency. At the 
same time, the results are not surprising given the attention paid to allegations of inferior 
quality of care in the nursing home industry (Institute of Medicine, 2001). Interestingly, a 
70 percent nonprofit market share characterizes the hospital industry but we cannot be 
certain if that figure represents the efficient mix. Why market forces have not naturally 
resulted in more nonprofit nursing homes remains a mystery. Noncompetitive factors 
such as the presence of third party payers and CON laws may provide some explanation 
for  the  underallocation  of  nonprofit  organizations  to  the  nursing  home  industry 
(Lakdawalla and Philipson, 1998). Future studies are certainly needed to sort out the real 
reason behind this observed inability or unwillingness of nursing home markets to make 




This paper offers a test of the efficiency of the ownership mix in nursing home markets 
across the U.S.  When consumers lack sufficient information about nursing home quality, 
the general notion is that nonprofit organizations generate societal benefits by offering 
(and  signaling)  quality  assurance,  but  they  may  simultaneously  result  in  higher 
production costs because of less attention devoted to efficiency.  The opposite scenario   15 
holds for for-profit organizations. Thus, a mix of ownership types in the marketplace may 
keep quality and costs under control as a result of competitive spillovers. 
In this study we proposed that the efficiency of the ownership mix might be inferred 
by  viewing  how  the  ownership  mix  affects  utilization  through  the  use  of  multiple 
regression analyses. Our empirical results suggest that too few nonprofit nursing homes 
characterize the typical nursing home market (county) of the U.S., at least in 1996.  As a 
result, greater quality of care per dollar could be achieved by encouraging more nonprofit 
nursing homes in most market areas of the U.S. Local and state policy makers may want 
to offer inducements such as zoning waivers and construction bond subsidies to attract 
more nonprofit nursing homes into their areas.  
Other studies following this approach are warranted, however, before any general 
conclusions may be drawn about the efficiency of the overall mix of nonprofit and for-
profit organizations in other healthcare industries such as hospital services or dialysis 
services. Also, our approach may be relevant for testing the efficiency of ownership mix 
in other sectors of the economy. For example, a mixture of ownership forms exists in the 
education services and utility industries and also in the local public sector (e.g., refuse 
collection).  By  following  our  approach,  researchers  will  be  able  to  determine  if 
competitive spillovers among ownership forms take place and to what degree a particular 
ownership form is underrepresented from a societal perspective. We encourage others to 
explore the efficiency of ownership forms in other sectors of the economy in the U.S. and 
in other countries.    16 
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Residents per capita  0.009  0.008  1995-1996 Online Survey, 
Certification and Reporting (OSCAR) 
Log population  10.311  1.314  2003 Area Resource File (ARF) 
Population density  220.92  43.83  2003 Area Resource File (ARF) 
Median county income  $19,286  $4,400  2003 Area Resource File (ARF) 
Female divorce rate (interpolated 1990, 
2000) 
0.089  0.020  2003 Area Resource File (ARF) 
Female unemployment rate (interpolated 
1990, 2000) 
0.058  0.027  2003 Area Resource File (ARF) 
Proportion of population that is white  0.839  0.180  2003 Area Resource File (ARF) 
Proportion of population in poverty (1997)  14.91  6.10  2003 Area Resource File (ARF) 
Log of CMS wage index   $8,265  $1,235  The Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) 
Proportion of Pop. 65 and older 
(interpolated 1990, 2000) 
0.149  0.042  2003 Area Resource File (ARF) 
Proportion of Pop. 85 and older 
(interpolated 1990, 2000) 
0.018  0.008  2003 Area Resource File (ARF) 
Nonprofit market share  0.231  0.309  1995-1996 Online Survey, 
Certification and Reporting (OSCAR)  
Certificate of need law   0.723  0.447  Harrington et al., 1998 
Moratorium  0.350  0.477  Harrington et al., 1998 
The average Medicaid rate in the state  80.58  18.64  Harrington et al., 1998 
Hospital facilities reimbursed differently   0.140  0.347  Harrington et al., 1998 
Retrospective reimbursement system   0.028  0.164  Harrington et al., 1998 
Combines prospective and retrospective 
systems 
0.102  0.303  Harrington et al., 1998 
Allows rate adjustment upward during or 
after rate period 
0.480  0.500  Harrington et al., 1998 
Employs case-mix reimbursement  0.556  0.497  Harrington et al., 1998 
Nonprofit share of hospital beds in 1986  0.467  0.448  American Hospital Association (AHA) 
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Table 2: Multiple Regression Results 
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Optimal Value  0.460  0.438  0.425  0.418 
Adjusted R
2  0.396  0.572  0.482  0.650 
   20 
Table 3 
Tabulation of NFPSHARE 
Sample: 1 2939 
Included observations: 2939 
Number of categories: 6 
      Cumulative  Cumulative 
Value  Count  Percent  Count  Percent 
[0, 0.2)  1786  60.77  1786  60.77 
[0.2, 0.4)  455  15.48  2241  76.25 
[0.4, 0.6)  309  10.51  2550  86.76 
[0.6, 0.8)  127  4.32  2677  91.09 
[0.8, 1)  34  1.16  2711  92.24 
[1, 1.2)  228  7.76  2939  100.00 
Total  2939  100.00  2939  100.00 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 For example, Chou’s (2002) empirical results support the theory that for-profit nursing homes practice 
opportunistic behavior and sacrifice quality of care for more profits when asymmetric information exists.  
 
2 Nyman and Bricker (1989) were among the first to use data envelopment analysis to show that nonprofit 
nursing homes produce with higher costs than otherwise similar for-profit nursing homes. 
 
3 In recent work by Kessler and McClellan (2002) examining the hospital market, areas with a stronger 
presence of for-profits have 2.4% lower overall expenditures, but virtually the same patient outcomes. 
 
4 Svorney finds empirically that physician licensure leads to a reduced consumption of physician services. 
That is, physician licensure increased entry costs (supply) by more than it increased consumer benefits 
from quality assurance (demand). Thus her results provide support for the special interest theory of 
physician licensure.  
 
5 Nonprofit organizations also result in lost tax revenues as pointed out by Lakdawalla and Philipson 
(1998). More tax revenues will be lost in less competitive market areas. Hence we control for the 
competitiveness of the nursing home market with a number of factors as explained later.  
 
6 Grabowski and Hirth also specify the growth of the elderly population for the 5-year period from 1991 to 
1996 as an additional instrument. Given that our dependent variable is the number of residents, this 
instrument is much less ideal that the lagged nonprofit hospital share. 
 
7 Similar results are obtained when all markets areas with a nonprofit market share of 100 percent are 
eliminated from the analysis. In some earlier work, we also controlled for several other factors including 
the number of doctors and hospitals per capita, the number of nursing homes per capita, the Herfindahl-
Hirschmann index of the market concentration of nursing homes, the percentage of nursing homes that 
were hospital based and in a chain, and the percentage of residents requiring assistance with daily living 
activities. The empirical findings from the multiple regression equations that include these variables 
support the general conclusions of the paper as presented. Including these variables, however, conflicts 
with our intention of estimating a reduced form model.   